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ABSTRACT 
“Apartheid” in France:  
Galvanization of Political Concern for the Role of Ethnic Identities in French Society 
 
 
The French state’s colorblind policy prescription is the base of a contentious, 
current debate over whether or not the government should acknowledge ethnic and 
racial components of its citizens and collect such data from minority groups. An 
increasingly colorful population presents new questions to the framework of French 
identity, legally blind to ethnicity, and tests the durability of the French model. Has 
the role of ethnic identity in France become a legitimate political concern under 
President Hollande’s administration despite legislation that outlaws ethnic data 
collection? Is the illegality of ethnic statistics detrimental to combatting 
discrimination and social fragmentation in France? Could the potential achievement 
of social stability outweigh the costs of straying from French values of a colorblind 
State? This thesis examines the support for and against the official collection of 
ethnic and racial statistics through the census, and considers why the need for 
discussion of multicultural identities has become imperative to maintaining social 
stability in the French Republic. In addition, this thesis questions if and how the 
practice of ignoring such data as a component of identity has been consequently 
detrimental to the formulation of public policies aimed at discouraging discriminatory 
practices and protecting the status of racially and ethnically diverse citizens in France. 
The issue of ethnicity has been embodied by current political discourse in President 
Hollande’s government, galvanizing an urgent call-to-arms to combat ethnic 
discrimination and social fragmentation.  
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“APARTHEID” IN FRANCE:  
GALVANIZATION OF POLITICAL CONCERN FOR THE ROLE OF 
ETHNIC IDENTITIES IN FRENCH SOCIETY  
 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
“It is prohibited to collect or process data of a personal nature that reveal, directly or 
indirectly, the racial or ethnic origins, the political, philosophical, or religious opinions, 
the union membership, the health or the sexual life of persons.” 
 
-Loi Informatique et Libertés, Act No 78-17 of 6 January 1978 
 
According to the Institut national de la statistique et des études economiques (Insee) 
population projections, there are 66,317,994 inhabitants in France as of 2015.1 The 
institute further breaks down the headcount into two indicateurs démographiques2: age 
and gender. The population consists of over thirty-four million women total. There are 
currently 801,799 people of the age 29 in France. Over eight million males are under the 
age of 20. Based upon definitive numbers from the 2012 census, Insee gives specific 
predictions of the French population by age group and gender as of January 1, 2015. The 
two chosen demographic indicators indicate factors of identity rendered inherent by the 
French government. While population statistics also consider differences in the 
populace’s nation of birth and immigration status, they lack ethnic or racial categories to 
calculate the existing diversity of modern French citizens. By strictly dividing population 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1“Population totale par sexes et âge ai 1er janvier 2015, France,” Insee (2015). 
http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/detail.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=bilan-demo&page=donnees-detaillees/bilan-
demo/pop_age2b.htm 2	  “demographic indicators” used to measure the population as designated by Insee. 
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data into age, gender, and citizenship status, the state adheres to its Republican promise 
to ignore ethnicity as a distinction in French identity and as a political influence.  
The ideologies upon which the first French Republic was founded are deeply rooted 
in the revolutionary slogan “liberté, égalité, fraternité,”3 intended to protect the French 
people within one, indivisible state. The goal of this abstract paradigm entrenched in the 
French subconscious is to provide freedom from oppression to ensure equality amongst a 
brotherhood of French citizens—a goal pursued by the illegality of official ethnic 
statistics but ultimately compromised by purposeful ignorance of diversity. The second 
line of Article 1er in Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen of 1789 further 
states that “Social distinctions may be founded only on considerations of the common 
good.”4 Though this article was conceived in the context of the Old Regime, in which 
privilege ensured distinction and constituted the foundation of society, its engrained 
principle has maintained relevance and been protected well into the 21st century. Among 
the seventeen articles establishing the universal rights endowed to man, the founders of 
the French Republic designated the first to devaluing the usefulness of social distinctions 
in order to assign precedence to man’s uniform identity as a French citizen. If social 
distinctions, such as ethnicity and race, do not contribute to the “common good,” then the 
merit of civic identity is held in higher esteem to the Republic than societal 
classifications. Civic identity attributes identity to one’s role as a citizen in contrast to an 
identity based on social constructions and cultural differentiations. This notion renders 
factors of race, ethnicity, and religion politically irrelevant within a homogenous body of 
citizens united under the Republic. It can be argued that it is because of its Revolutionary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 “liberty, equality, fraternity”	  
4 “Les distinctions sociales ne peuvent être fondées que sur l’utilité commune.” 
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and Republican principles that France “simply cannot think in terms of racial groups,” 
but analysts and historians “frequently overlook or soft-pedal race-conscious elements” 
of French history that prove that racial and ethnic divides infiltrated the legacy of 
colonialism and post-colonial relations.5 
Because the French government outlaws state-initiated collection of data regarding 
racial and ethnic demographics, non-recognition of racial and ethnic minorities as an 
existing social group has become an institutionalized practice. French national narrative 
reveals a history of a culture valuing identity as a citizen over alternative social 
distinctions deemed irrelevant—a principle clearly defined in the Constitution. The result 
is a rigid social framework that only offers foreigners the opportunity to assimilate into a 
predetermined French identity rather than integrate into society under proposals of 
multiculturalism. Distraught by rabid tensions between the Français de souche and the 
Français de papier6, the French government is confined by its founding principles that 
restrict the political sphere from using ethnic discourse as a tool to discuss discrimination 
nationwide. While defenders of Republicanism laud ethnic non-recognition as a means of 
preventing discrimination, the evident marginalization of minority groups in France 
cannot be ignored. In fact, Prime Minister Manuel Valls warned, “It is necessary to 
regard the reality of our country,”7 followed by a bold accusation that his country has 
become a “territorial, social, and ethnic apartheid”8 in his January 20 voeux à la presse 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Erik Bleich, “Antiracism with Races,” French Politics, Culture & Society, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2000), 53-54.  
6 “Souche” translates as descent, thus the Français de souche refers to an exclusive group of those who are 
of French descent. In contrast, “papier” translates as paper and refers to those who immigrated and are 
merely French by documentation.  
7 “Il faut aussi regarder la réalité de notre pays,” translation mine.	  
8 “apartheid territorial, social, ethnique,” translation mine. 
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speech.9 The Prime Minister’s use of polemical discourse such as “ethnic apartheid” in a 
public political sphere accustomed to silently overlooking such minority conflicts 
suggests the rising need to address the ethnic and racial components of society that 
interfere with social cohesion as a result of their invisibility.  
The French state’s colorblind policy prescription is the base of a contentious ongoing 
debate over whether or not the government should acknowledge ethnic components of its 
citizenship and collect such data from minority groups.  The Republican strategy of 
“equality through invisibility,”10 as described by French demographer Patrick Simon and 
explored in a later chapter, has grown more and more contested in recent decades marked 
by an influx of ethnically diverse (and predominantly North African) immigrants, who 
vary from the initial waves of immigrants in the early 20th century arriving from other 
European countries. An increasingly colorful population presents new questions about the 
concept of identity in a colorblind French state that is not yet capable of providing 
answers. As the debate escalates and social tensions require more and more attention, 
discussions of ethnicity have migrated from the streets of France to the lips of President 
François Hollande’s government. This brings me to my thesis question.  
Has the role of ethnic identity in France become a legitimate political concern under 
President Hollande’s administration despite legislation that outlaws ethnic data 
collection? This question is followed with sub questions. Is the illegality of ethnic 
statistics detrimental to combatting discrimination and social fragmentation in France? 
Could the potential achievement of social stability outweigh the costs of straying from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Sylvia Zappi, “Manuel Valls, l’apartheid et les banlieues,” Le Monde (2015), 
http://www.lemonde.fr/banlieues/article/2015/01/26/manuel-valls-l-apartheid-et-les-
banlieues_4563754_1653530.html 
10 Patrick Simon, “The Choice of Ignorance: The Debate on Ethnic and Racial Statistics in France,” French 
Politics, Culture & Society, Vol. 26, No. 1, (2008), 7-31.	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French values of a colorblind State? This thesis will first explain ethnicity and its 
significance as a component of identity to provide context for my thesis question. The 
introductory chapter will conclude with background of the census in France and context 
for the establishment of categories used by the census. In the second chapter I shall 
examine the current debate for and against the official collection of ethnic statistics 
through the census and consider if the need for discussion of ethnic identities has become 
imperative to maintaining social stability in the French Republic. In addition to 
consideration of the role of ethnic statistics, I shall question if and how the practice of 
ignoring such data as a component of identity has been consequently detrimental to the 
formulation of public policies designed to discourage discriminatory practices and protect 
the status of ethnically different citizens in France. The third chapter will discuss the 
ways in which ethnocentric issues appear to have obtained legitimacy in the political 
sphere under President Hollande’s government. Ethnic issues that were previously 
masked as geographic or socio-economic concerns in need of policy reform are now 
accepted for their ethnic dimension in political discourse. In the fourth chapter I plan to 
compare and contrast the role of ethnic identities in the very different approaches to 
diversity employed by France and the United States. I will employ qualitative research 
methods to draw data from an analysis of primary and secondary sources in English and 
French. I aim to understand the role of ethnicity in French current events in correlation 
with a history of contrasting cultural values to reach my conclusion.  
1.1 WHY IS ETHNICITY IMPORTANT? 
What is it that advocates for ethnic statistics want to be measured? What is really 
being discussed in reference to ethnicity as a quantifiable category? The concept of 
	   6 
ethnicity and race are complex and must be clarified before continuing to ascribe them 
with significance as a component of identity. Ethnicity and race, as they will be further 
discussed throughout this thesis, are two distinct concepts that are neither synonymous 
nor unrelated. They exist as social constructs filling the intrinsic human need to stratify 
those who are different. Neither notion preceded the man-made desire to differentiate 
between social groups, and their perpetuated existence relies on society’s consent in 
acknowledging separate social groups. Ethnicity acts as an umbrella term encompassing 
race, culture, language, and religion, while race refers to perceived biologically attained 
traits. While “racial identity refers to an individual’s awareness of himself or herself as a 
member of a particular, socially defined group…the term ethnic or ethnic identity is a 
broader category that may refer to racial classification and/or cultural factors.”11 Thus I 
shall henceforth only mention ethnicity because its more general nature is meant to 
include the dimension of race, rather than refer to both ethnicity and race as sister 
constructions. One’s ethnic identity describes how his or her cultural attributes are 
perceived by both the individual and society. In highlighting variation through the 
construction of ethnicity, comparisons are inevitably made and social hierarchies are 
imagined. To say two people are identified by separate ethnicities is to say they are not 
the same. If they are not the same, then how and why are they dissimilar? Does 
dissimilarity warrant dissimilar merit or establish a hierarchy of ethnicities?  
French policy and legislation adhere to a colorblind approach to citizenship—by 
which French citizens are identical in the eyes of the State and indistinguishable by 
perceived ethnic or racial differences—to endorse “equality through invisibility.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Joseph F. Aponte and Laura R. Johnson, “The Impact of Culture on Intervention and Treatment of 
Ethnic Populations,” Psychological Intervention and Cultural Diversity 2nd edition (Needham Heights, 
MA: Allyn and Bacon, 2000), 22.	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However, supporters of collecting ethnic statistics critique the paradox of this slogan. 
Endorsing invisibility by the eye of the state means that France is blind to its ethnic 
populations. The ethnic groups implied to be protected by such a colorblind method are 
not represented in statistical data. Instead they are forcibly unseen by the State in an 
attempt to eliminate discrimination by eliminating basis for discrimination. In theory it 
would seem that discrimination could not be planted in homogenous ground; however 
France’s identical criteria of citizenship does not translate into the reality of a 
homogenous society. While a colorblind approach may not differentiate between black 
and white, it only leaves a nation in a shade of gray that is a bleak misrepresentation of its 
demographic composition. The debate whether the state should officially collect ethnic 
statistics as an effective means of recognizing minority populations will be discussed in 
the following chapter. 
Following the assumption that ethnicity exists as a social construction, it is crucial 
to interpret its role as an influential social and political factor in contemporary society. If 
citizenship were truly homogenous, then the need to quantify ethnic groups would have 
no clout in the debate because ethnic demographics would fail to present a valuable 
perspective to policy implementation. Regardless of the State’s volition to maintain 
colorblind civic identity, French society faces the challenges presented by inevitable 
ethnic consciousness. Studies in cross-cultural psychology offer insight into the impact 
that bicultural confrontation has on individuals and how such acculturation processes 
pervade at the group level. Psychologist John W. Berry examines the changes that occur 
when two cultures come into contact—a study that explicitly legitimizes the need to 
understand and recognize ethnicity as a critical dynamic in shaping social cohesion.  
	   8 
Berry’s studies revolve around the consequences of acculturation, a term that 
refers to “the process of cultural and psychological change that results following meeting 
between cultures.”12 For the purpose of this thesis, I am solely addressing the cultural 
implications at the group level rather the psychological implications at the individual 
level. Acculturation occurs between a dominant receiving social group and a non-
dominant group that introduces its foreign cultural characteristics. This conjunction 
provides a format for observing how an ethnic minority adapts within the structure of a 
pre-existing dominant ethnic group. Berry explains that a society composed of multiple 
cultural backgrounds or ethnicities, such as France, inevitably falls victim to social 
hierarchy of groups.  
“As a result of immigration, many societies become culturally plural. That 
is, people of many cultural backgrounds come to live together in a diverse 
society. In many cases they form cultural groups that are not equal in 
power (numerical, economic, or political). These power differences have 
given rise to popular and social science terms such as ‘mainstream’, 
‘minority’, ‘ethnic group’, etc.”13  
 
Such discourse emerges as the division of groups via ethnic identity becomes 
weighted with status. The citation above already begins to fragment France’s defense of 
upholding republican values to ensure equality and freedom from discrimination by not 
recognizing ethnicity as Berry asserts the natural tendency of social groups not to hold 
equal power within a culturally plural state. The power differences Berry alludes to are 
enacted by the ‘ethnic majority’ and the ‘ethnic minorities.’ Because the ethnic majority 
in France is white European and French perception of identity has become accustomed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  David L. Sam and John W. Berry, “Acculturation: When Individuals and Groups of Different Cultural 
Backgrounds Meet,” Perspectives on Psychological Science, Vol. 5, No. 4 (2010), 1.	  13	  John W. Berry. “Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation,” Applied Psychology: an International 
Review, 1997, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1997), 8. 
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over the centuries to identifying itself as such, ethnic minority refers to French citizens 
who are not white European.  
Acculturative developments are applied to various stages of adaptation success 
through four strategies according to Berry: assimilation, separation, integration, and 
marginalization. These four possible outcomes of cross-cultural encounters represent a 
range of acculturation outcomes as non-dominant ‘ethnic minority’ groups struggle with 
various degrees of difficulty adapting and coexisting amongst the dominant ‘ethnic 
majority’ group. Acculturation theory indicates a challenge that immigrants and their 
descendants face and the social disadvantage they immediately inherit upon entering a 
community or state where they are not the ethnic majority. The manner in which the host 
community receives an ethnic minority is a significant factor in determining which of 
Berry’s four fates it will endure. Likewise the public’s attitude towards accepting 
increasing diversity shapes and is shaped by immigration and anti-discrimination 
policies. France has customarily taken an assimilationist approach to integrating 
immigrants, according to which individuals settling into French culture are expected to 
adapt its values and assume French identity14.  
So why do ethnic statistics matter? How does the French Republic benefit from 
addressing the acculturation process of its immigrant population? Ethnic attributes are 
essential components of one’s identity; they are not the only descriptors of identity, but 
they are inevitably significant in the extent of their religious, racial, cultural, and 
linguistic influences. However, there is a reoccurring power struggle between the 
diversity of ethnic identities and a singular civic identity, that of a predefined French 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Driss Maghraoui, “French Identity, Islam, and North Africans,” French Civilization and Its Discontents: 
Nationalism, Colonialism, and Race (New York: Lexington Books, 2003), 214. 
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citizen. It is this struggle that has become the subject of the political spotlight amongst 
the left and right as the role of immigrants and their descendants is questioned in the face 
of social cohesion. Berry’s explanation of acculturation and its various outcomes (i.e. 
assimilation, integration, etc.) provides insight into which type of society is most 
conducive to the adaptation of newly immigrated citizens and to the maintenance of 
social cohesion. The necessary socio-political environment is determined by policy and 
public opinion, thus social cohesion depends upon their response to immigrants and 
ethnic diversity. However, the French do not know the ethnic composition of their 
country. Private institutions speculate a range of numbers of various ethnic and religious 
groups, but there is little official data offering information on ethnic demographics within 
France.  
While the universalist principle upon which the French refuse to collect ethnic 
data is an honorable tribute to true democracy, ethnic minorities are disregarded by the 
lack of explicit ethnic information and disadvantaged by a democracy that is blind to their 
demographic presence. The very notion of France’s assimilationist integration policy 
reveals a relationship of power between “those who assimilate and the ones who are 
being assimilated…Assimilation is hence a kind of cultural passport that right-wing 
political parties require in order to obtain citizenship rights.”15 The disjunction between 
ethnic and civic identity and the subsequent tensions that arise from the conflict suggest a 
need for a revision of policy based on analysis of acculturation. Ethnicity, though socially 
constructed, is a distinction widely accepted and noted by society as a possible source of 
social, political, and economic division. Rather than ignore outcomes of social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Maghraoui, “French Identity, Islam, and North Africans,” 220.	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fragmentation, policy could incorporate ethnic data to broaden understanding of if and 
how ethnic minorities are affected or disadvantaged during acculturation. Hafid Gafaiti 
suggests in his article “The Construction of French Identity” that “the ideas of 
assimilation, uniformity, and universality of the French model of the nation—‘la 
République une et indivisible’—have been crucial in masking ethnic, regional, and other 
differences.”16 The contradictory nature of this model lends itself to marginalizing those 
citizens who fall into a series of categories of perceived differences, whether they are 
ethnic, racial, religious, or otherwise.  Unfortunately, evaluation relies upon the judgment 
of evidence, of which there is conveniently little. I do not mean to suggest that ethnic 
statistics are the panacea for social cohesion, but a legitimate assessment of ethnic 
presence in France could reflect the state’s legitimate interest in tensions caused by the 
existing French model of assimilation. This inflexible model, created by the Third 
Republic with the purpose of assimilating various regions of France with strong linguistic 
and cultural identities, is inherently incapable of socially adopting citizens who have 
religious and cultural backgrounds that deviate from the French standard.17 As an 
advocate of multiculturalism, I do not accept assimilation as a viable approach to 
immigration policy. To eliminate difference is not to eliminate discrimination, thus the 
most realistic option for French policy pursuing equality amongst citizens would be to 
abandon assimilation and recognize that ethnic plurality has become an unavoidable, or 
even positive, dimension of society. 
1.2 CENSUS BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS OF THE DEBATE 
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 Before discussing the current debate over the potential benefits and consequences 
of state-collected ethnic and racial statistics, it is necessary to track the history of the 
census for a contextual background of the debate. The notion of France as a nation that 
does not acknowledge its citizen children as distinct members of different social groups is 
one that is inscribed in French national narrative and a source of immense pride for its 
people. The fact that France has strictly upheld such institutionalized blindness to race 
and ethnicity, while other countries like the United States actively address such 
categorical differences, is considered testimony to a true democratic Republic. Though 
the State may not officially recognize ethnic labels, many different terms have emerged 
in French society to describe immigrants and minority groups. 
The development of rhetoric used to describe various social groups reflects a 
dichotomy between “French” and “Non-French” that does not correspond to the state’s 
dedication to an indivisible Republic. The earliest censuses in France collected 
rudimentary information on household facts and national origin. Starting in 1891, the 
census categorized citizenship under three labels: “French,” “French by acquisition,” and 
“foreigners.”18 Though this chosen nomenclature did not address distinction by ethnicity 
or race, it did distinguish different levels of citizenship and suggested that the label 
“French” was a higher citizenship status of birthright that could never be attained by 
“French by acquisition.” It was not until 1999 that the category immigré, meaning 
immigrant, appeared in the census and became a source of much controversy between 
those perceived as “French” and “Non-French.” The introduction of the ethnically 
charged category brought forth the debate over ethnic statistics that would permeate 
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France’s political sphere into the 21st century. The term immigré was perceived with a 
negative connotation of being less assimilated into French culture than “French by 
acquisition.” 
 In addition to the census’ official categories, colloquial jargon ascribed to various 
ethnic groups emerged and changed over time to reflection these minorities’ position in 
French society. The end of France’s colonial presence in Northern Africa was followed 
by a heavy flow of North African immigrants into France during the 1960s. The singular 
term Maghrébin was coined in the 1970s to refer collectively to those who originated 
from the Maghreb region, western North Africa, and were predominantly Muslim Arabs. 
Eventually immigré “came to identify essentially the members of the North African 
community” regardless of whether they had emigrated or were descendants of 
immigrants.19 The term did not extent to immigrants from other European countries 
because their ethnic likeness allowed them to assimilate easily and invisibly.  
The cultural collectivization of North Africans under a single title caused 
automatic exclusion from French natives. Jean-Marie Le Pen, the founder of the far right 
National Front, saw France’s rigid assimilationist model as unable to accept Maghrébins 
because “ethnically, culturally, and religiously, the North African cannot be integrated in 
French society.”20 French-born descendants of immigrés were given a new title, beur, that 
granted them status of a French national but not access to French citizenship, according 
to French pundit Hafid Gafaiti’s theory of the construction of French identity. The name 
beur came from verlan, a form of slang consisting of inverted syllables, for describing 
Arabs. Amongst the slang variations of ethnic identity placed upon descendants of 	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immigrants, civic identity remained binary with a clear divide between citizens accepted 
as “French” and those deemed otherwise.  
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
The Debate: French Arguments For and Against the Official 
Collection of Ethnic and Racial Data 
 
“[1] Statistics by ethnic categories are dangerous because they stigmatize people and are 
likely to support xenophobic or racist behavior. [2] Statistics by ethnic categories are 
necessary to fight against discrimination.” 
-Laurent Thévenot21 
 
For over a century and a half, state-funded institutions in France have complied 
with the Constitution in disregarding ethnic statistics as a quantifiable demographic. The 
census has collected and stored information on nationality and country of birth of 
immigrants, but such categorization fails to acknowledge second and third generations 
descending from immigrants who remain in limbo between French citizenship and ethnic 
identity that is not specified in the census. Information on ethnic background was deemed 
extraneous to the Republic’s goal of sustaining an integration model that would cause 
immigrants to “gradually lose their cultural and linguistic distinctiveness as they 
progressed on the path to citizenship.”22 While French policy commitment to an 
assimilationist model has maintained widespread support from the public sphere and high 
approval of citizens who wish to preserve pride in a strict French civic identity, there has 
been a spike in criticism on the statistics ban.  	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A virulent discussion of the potential role that state-acknowledged ethnic 
demographics could play in addressing social cohesion is in discordance with the 
historical preference to uphold democratic values of citizenship equality. However, 
increasing social fragmentation between populations considered ethnically French 
(European Caucasian) and ethnically “other” is evident in employment, housing, and 
education sectors as a result of an inefficient immigrant integration model.23 The current 
debate over the benefits and effectiveness of state-sponsored ethnic data collection is 
contested by two sides, universalist Republicans who denounce the danger of ethnicizing 
or racializing society by expanding civic identity to include cultural components and, 
alternatively, the supporters of ethnic statistics as a means of addressing diversity and 
publicly discussing existing issues of discrimination. In this chapter I shall present the 
various arguments for and against incorporating ethnic statistics into the political 
consciousness of the French Republic.  
2.1 SUPPORT FOR THE COLLECTION OF ETHNIC STATISTICS 
 A reoccurring argument from supporters of quantifying ethnic presence within the 
population revolves around a desire to legitimize discussion of the issue of discrimination 
and prejudice within France. Just because the state does not publicly categorize its 
citizens through the lens of ethnicity does not mean that conflicts of ethnicity are not 
prevalent in French media and quotidian encounters. Conversations aimed at dissipating 
discriminatory undertones noticeable in daily life are thwarted by legislative restrictions 
that limit official data availability. It is apparent that the implementation of colorblind 
legislation has left the descendants of immigrants invisible and unheard in flagrant 	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contrast with the political credo of protecting individual civic liberties for which it was 
intended.  
 Patrick Simon of the Institut National d’Études Démographiques provides a 
scathing critique of the French policy in his 2008 article “The Choice of Ignorance: The 
Debate of Ethnic and Racial Statistics.” He points to the limits of the existing “equality 
through invisibility" strategy in enforcing assimilation and states:  
“Such invisibility therefore occupies a central position in the French 
political and legal framework, since it is supposed to ensure equality of all 
before the law and, consequently in social life…The credo of indifference 
to differences—the French colorblind approach—leads to promoting what 
I would call the choice of ignorance by removing any reference to ethnic 
of racial origin from policies or laws (in compliance with the Constitution) 
as well as from statistics.”24    
            
A substantial ethnic presence of immigrants and their descendants exists in France, yet 
Simon accuses the state of pursuing the so-called “choice of ignorance” in overlooking 
the political and societal needs of this demographic. Simon employs the slogan “equality 
through invisibility” to emphasize the hypocritical nature of protecting the liberties of a 
group by eradicating diversity and forging sameness amongst all French citizens. It is 
possible that there is a correlation between growing social fragmentation as ethnic 
minority groups grow in the midst of an environment that demands assimilation into a 
finite French civic identity, but Simon boldly hints that the illegality of ethnic statistics 
may be purposefully maintained by the State to conceal the existence discrimination and 
its magnitude.25 Discussions of discrimination and criminality associated with the 
banlieues (metropolitan extremities classified by residents who are predominantly 
Maghreb immigrants or descendants of North African origin and are socially 	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immobilized by low socio-economic standing) have dominated political agenda in the 
21st century, particularly since the riots of November 2005 throughout Parisian banlieues.  
The statistics debate has emerged to challenge French strategy of ignoring differences 
and the colorblind character of the Republic itself, to crystallize conflict and bring it to 
the political forefront through the fight for quantitative data.  
 Simon recalls previous censuses spanning from 1891 to 1999 in which assigning 
nation of origin was accomplished by dividing the population into three statuses: 
“French,” “French by acquisition,” “foreigners.”26 Though these categories oblige legal 
ethnic avoidance within the framework of nationality, they differentiate in how one has 
become French, either by birth or by acquisition. Becoming a French citizen through 
naturalization still leaves an immigrant short of becoming purely “French” as deemed by 
the state. According to Simon, “statistics are not simply a reflection of self-evident 
administrative categories but are constructed in response to issues of public policy.”27 If 
categories reflect policy issues, then it appears that new ethnic categories could be 
implemented to support policy directed towards endorsing integration and anti-
discrimination.  
As nomenclature dictates how society identifies itself and how legislative 
representation responds to society’s needs, advocates of ethnic statistics rarely explain 
their support as emphasizing the value of scientific data as such, but as a means of 
providing evidence for an unrepresented body of social minorities in a discussion about 
social cohesion in France. Their position relies on the assumption that more data will 
provide measurements of discrimination and disadvantage linked to ethnicity and enable 	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public understanding of the extent of these problems. David Oppenheimer claims that, 
“In the absence of state-generated data, it seems clear that there are important questions 
about the wealth, income, opportunities and social status of French citizens that we 
cannot fully answer. As a result, those who wish to address the problem are left without 
an important tool, while those who do not regard discrimination and inequality as an 
issue in French life are permitted to hide behind this lack of data.”28 Policy may be 
colorblind towards data, but French citizens and leaders are far from blind to the 
challenges presented by diversity. Advocates of improving social and economic standing 
of disadvantaged minority groups are thus thwarted by the state’s silence and left without 
the tools needed for combat, according to Oppenheimer. 
The conviction that statistics of various French ethnic groups could contribute to 
and scientifically legitimize the fight against perception of discrimination is further 
upheld by the Association Nationale des Elus Locaux pour la diversité (ANELD).29 This 
political organization, which harnesses support for diversity within France in regards 
issues related to ethnicity such as employment and civil rights, conducted a study of how 
the United States handles ethnicity during a trip to Washington D.C. in 2011. Over the 
course of a week ANELD representatives met with “members of civil rights 
organizations like the National Urban League and Rev. Jesse Jackson’s Rainbow PUSH 
Coalition, as well as numerous other representatives from both public and private 
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sectors”30 to observe how the United States responds to its growing ethnic populations 
and to the challenging issues that arise in response to such diversity. Representatives 
returned home to France with the impression that the U.S. was years ahead of France is 
mediating issues resulting from diversity and asserting that the debate on a national 
identity that excludes ethnic and cultural components contribute to social fragmentation. 
ANELD’s positive review of American handlings of diversity through understanding 
brought forward by ethnic statistics can be summed up by two quotes from 
representatives sent on the trip: “If we want to improve the situation of minorities in 
France, we have to be able to evaluate it…One way to create awareness is to show people 
the numbers” and “How can we correct or improve the situation if we have no picture of 
it?”31 
The study conducted by ANELD took place after the debate was sparked by 
Sarkozy’s political investigation of ethnicity’s role in social cohesion that commenced in 
2009. The President, who created the Committee for the Measurement of Diversity in 
2009, suggested that French policymakers inquire as to how “American-style equal 
opportunity, quotas and the use of ethnic data within official statistics to get a more 
accurate picture of the nation’s face.” A 2009 TIME article by Bruce Crumley titled 
“Should France Count Its Minority Population?” provides an American interpretation of 
the debate that predictably swings towards the need to collect ethnic data and 
acknowledge the existing role of ethnic identity complimentary to civic identity. Crumley 
acknowledges that the notion of an indivisible France is noble in theory but often mocked 	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by reality and contradicted by action. Yazid Sabeg, diversity commissioner who launched 
Sarkozy’s Committee for the Measurement of Diversty, is quoted in the article as saying 
“There are two Frances. One wants to look things in the face—meaning the way 
demographics in this country have changed. The other is conservative France, which is 
prone to immobility in the name of largely artificial equality.” This description of a two-
faced France suggests a divide between those who want to see ethnic diversity and those 
who do not. Likewise, Manuel Valls’ speech, mentioned earlier in the introduction, 
declared that France was comparable to apartheid because of its ethnic divisions. 
Fragmentation of political ideals is represented as occurring within the group classified as 
ethnically French (“two Frances”) as well as between the ethnically French and ethnic 
minorities (“ethnic apartheid”). The consistent assertion of a socially divided France 
across the political spectrum32 validates the State’s need—political interests aside—to 
combat social instability wrought with ethnic tensions.  
In fact, political interests have come to play a significant role in the backing of ethnic 
statistics. French colorblind policy has labored to assure its citizens freedom from the 
persecution of differences to counter threats from the Far Right since the National Front’s 
emergence and growth in the 1970s. While initiated by a history of Revolutionary 
declarations, nation-state ideals, and regrets of the Vichy era, the colorblind republican 
flag became antiracist leaders’ most promising approach to facing the challenges posed 
by the Far Right’s radical anti-immigration proposals.33 Ethnic discourse and the 
ambiguity of its role transformed into a sharp political tool for the Left in the 1980s and 
1990s as antiracists rallied around the colorblind method to fight the National Front’s 	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opposition towards multiculturalism and diversity.34 In continuing to officially recognize 
French citizens solely on their citizenship status, the French method has attempted to 
lessen discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and affiliated socio-economic status.  
Finally, the call for ethnic statistic collection and addressing disadvantaged 
populations is heard from French immigrants and their descendants. Though many 
dispute it as advantageous to their interests, there exist ethnic minorities who agree that 
their invisibility in the eyes of state policy corresponds with assimilation struggles and 
receiving civil equality. Senegalese-born Rama Yade35, author of Blacks of France, 
writes “one sometimes has the strange impression of upsetting others by being black in a 
country that thinks of itself as white.” Yade gives insight into the notion that France 
perceives itself as a white nation—a belief that is hardly hindered or question by non-
existent state records of the country’s colorful ethnic makeup. It is hoped that black-and-
white quantitative data would provide a stepping-stone in the direction of addressing the 
equality gap, considering that the discussion of black and white (and all colors in 
between) issues currently has little institutional foundation to stand upon other than 
societal evidence. For France to correct ingrained discriminatory practices, rather than 
quietly acknowledge them as commonplace, it must have the “courage” to name the 
victims who bear the brunt of discrimination.36 Results of a 2007 poll by the European 
Commission show that 78% of French respondents would not object to answering 
anonymous questions about their racial identity if it would aid in combatting 
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discrimination.37 If this majority opinion is still held today, why are ethnic statistics still 
contested as a threat to equality? In the following section I shall present the French 
ideology behind denouncing ethnic identity as a state-officiated census category.  
2.2 OPPOSITION TO THE COLLECTION OF ETHNIC STATISTICS 
 Since World War II, Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the United States have 
received a proportionately similar influx of immigrants. These nations are comparable in 
that they have all made a high percentage of first- and second-generation immigrants into 
citizens.38 These four countries quickly became diversified and have responded with a 
variety of immigration and integration policies of varying success. Of these examples, 
France is the only to deny race-consciousness a place in the public sphere. The United 
States, Britain, and the Netherlands all collect ethnic data in order to create awareness of 
its demographic range, while the French state holds steadfast to its colorblind policy 
founded upon principles of égalité. While Patrick Simon calls this mentality a “choice of 
ignorance” on behalf of the state, many French citizens know equal opportunity protected 
by non-recognition of ethnic differentiation as a fundamental principle upon which the 
nation was established. France has not hesitated in continuing to implement its core 
values as endowed by the Constitution, even as Britain and the Netherlands have adapted 
broader multiculturalist policies in response to changing demographics. Those who 
oppose the collection of ethnic statistics do not base their decision on an ignorance of or 
lack of interest in ethnicity, intent to exclude non-white French citizens, or will to mask 
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evidence of discrimination; rather, they condone ethnic data as a threat to the democratic 
Republic they take such pride in.  
 In describing the French model of colorblind integration, political scientist Erik 
Bleich argues that “there is a normative consensus in France that affirmative action or 
any race-conscious policy is anathema to French values.”39 Given perspective dictated by 
the French national narrative, the opposition is not attacking diversity or ethnic inclusion 
but merely defending national ideals. In some sense, collecting ethnic statistics is a 
betrayal to the French promise to value all citizens as such without regard for cultural 
distinctions. Memories of the Revolution and Republican traditions are called upon to 
support a history of colorblind policy ingrained in the country based on the mother ideas 
of the “French state” founded during the Enlightenment.40 In contrast, the evil of straying 
from strict observance of the Constitution is remembered with the haunting recollection 
of the Vichy era during which ethnic and racial distinctions were used to target the 
Jewish population. Lingering memories of Holocaust horror and the dark days of German 
occupation that stripped France of its liberté, égalité, fraternité mantra provide 
opposition with historical justification for refusing to return to ethnicization policies 
reminiscent of the Nazi party. Fadela Amara, former Secretary of State for Urban Affairs 
who served in Sarkozy’s government from 2007 to 2010, used this painful memory to 
deem ethnic statistics dangerous in stating: “Our republic must not become a mosaic of 
communities…No one should again have to wear a yellow star.”41 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Ibid, 271.	  40	  The construction of the idea of a nation and its people were studied by philosophes such as Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, according to Gafaiti, “The Construction of French Identity,” 195.  41	  Bruce Crumley, “Should France Count Its Minority Population?” TIME (2009). 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887106,00.html 
	  24 
 While supporters of ethnic data collection view the data as a tool for responding 
to the problem of discrimination against disadvantaged ethnic minorities, the opposition 
considers the statistics the problem themselves. Seeing as ethnic and racial identities are 
social constructions created and empowered by societal consent to acknowledge 
difference, French legislation abstains from commenting on any perceived differences 
outside of the framework of French civic identity. Thus the opposition views state-
officiated ethnic statistics as a promotion and legitimization of labels that divide French 
citizens among discriminatory lines that are irrelevant to the criteria of citizenship. Bleich 
describes the 1978 law against storing ethnic data as being aimed “to punish racists 
committing bigoted acts motivated by racist intent, not to foster numerical racial 
inequality nor to compensate a class of victims defined by race.”42 It can be understood 
that recognizing difference and naming it as such is an act of bigotry itself, one that 
would be committed with state authority if ethnic data were collected as respected 
scientific data.  
 The existence of discrimination amongst social divides in France is undisputed, 
but the efficacy of ethnicity-based data as a necessary contribution for mediation is 
doubted. The opposition fears that encouraging citizens to identify themselves by ethnic 
attributes would only reiterate division and reinforce social discrimination in a legal 
format. “Even if it’s out to do the right thing, positive discrimination remains 
discrimination, and classifying people by race and ethnicity is in a manner racism itself,” 
explains Malek Boutih, who was leader of S.O.S. Racisme,43 an antiracism civil rights 
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  Bleich, “The French Model: Color-Blind Integration,” 274. 43	  S.O.S. Racisme, founded in 1984, was the first national group dedicated to fighting racism. With the 
support of the Socialist Party during the 1980s and early 1990s, it played a significant role in lobbying for 
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group that vehemently opposes ethnic statistics.44 Despite existing in a race-neutral 
paradigm, the antiracist movement has established a notable presence in commenting on 
discrimination in the public sphere.45 
The efficacy of quantifiable ethnic categories in combating racism is not proven. 
However, opposition actors see the colorblind policy as the direct means of eliminating 
racism and discrimination within France. The logic follows the fact that there cannot be 
racism if there are no races. While this seems counterintuitive to American doctrine, 
colorblind policy has been the cornerstone for avoiding ethnic dilemmas and resisting 
natural tendencies to exclude social minorities. Political Scientist Erik Bleich argues 
policies create politics and policies that recognize race create race politics, thus French 
colorblind policy prescription may “demonstrate a way to fight racism without reifying 
the concept of race.”46 It is inaccurate to say that French avoidance of race as a political 
subject translates into political passivity towards racism. Active antiracism has indeed 
been the political objective of colorblind measures in France. While historical references 
are always made towards the Revolution and Republican values as the simple reasoning 
behind national blindness to ethnicity, Bleich argues that selective memory is used to 
emphasize the founding principles of the state as justification for the continued used of 
contemporary policies.47 Such justification overlooks the period in between of colonialist 
imperialism that dominated the 19th century and the decades up until the World Wars. 
Legal opposition of ethnic categorization and active antiracism legislation was not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reforms made to urban planning, education, and integration to mitigate discrimination and bring the issue to 
the forefront of French public life. 44	  Crumley, “Should France Count Its Minority Population?”.  45	  Bleich, “Antiracism Without Races,” 60. 
46 Ibid., 50.  
47 Ibid., 53.	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revamped until the regrets of Vichy era persecution surfaced. Colorblindness was 
thenceforth seen as a political necessity for protection of ethnicity groups. Though it’s 
attacked by supporters of ethnic statistics as a means of socially disenfranchising 
minority groups, the state strived to undermine social prejudices through a series of laws 
against discrimination, most notably those in 1972, 1978, and 1990.48 
The rise of the far-right political party, the National Front or Front National, over 
the course of the 1970s and 1980s acted as a catalyst in crystallizing French fervent 
dedication to colorblindness to counter the radical party’s anti-immigration (and often 
anti-diversity) stance. The party’s dissent towards the growing multiculturalist dimension 
in France was responded to by assurance that ethnic groups would be protected by 
disallowing them to be targeted as such, as some fear could happen through the 
legalization of ethnic data collection. Bleich explains French rationale behind developing 
avid colorblindness as a tool for crippling racism: 
“France fights racism through its laws, but it does so in a particular 
fashion. As with the core of the 1972 law, the 1990 Gayssot law attacked a 
certain kind of racism. It strengthened penalties against hate speech by the 
far Right organizations. Although the FN (Front National) provided the 
immediate incentives for action in the late 1980s and 1990s, it did not 
restructure French thinking about racism or races. If anything, it reinforced 
the notion that identifying individuals by their group attributes and 
counting or targeting policies at races, ethnic groups, or identity-based 
communities was playing into the hands of the far right. Leading French 
antiracists have not always been of one mind in this conclusion. But the 
brief window of opportunity for a multicultural approach to problems of 
ethnic diversity all but closed with the rise of the National Front in the 
mid-1980s. Since that time, most antiracist leaders have rallied around the 
color-blind republican flag as the most promising approach to the 
challenges posed by the Far Right.”49 
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Colorblind policy has been a crucial political tool in hampering the far right from 
mobilizing legitimate backing of discriminatory policies. However, Bleich acknowledges 
that the state’s efforts have only succeeded in preventing a certain kind of racism. 
Intentional racism on a legal level has been blocked—like that supported by the National 
Front—but “indirect or unintentional racism” is still prevalent on a social level that 
affects housing, employment, and education on a daily basis for minority ethnic groups. 
Supporters of ethnic statistics worry that quantifiable data is necessary to measure the 
extent to which racism and discrimination may affect the standard of living for some of 
France’s population, but this addresses the social realm that is less easily controlled than 
the judicial realm of legislation. The opposition may be correct that the colorblind 
strategy of the French state establishes a political agenda that should dismantle 
discriminatory practices, but France can no longer afford to be blind to the challenges 
presented by ethnic diversity that compromise social cohesion. The following chapter 
will examine the debate in current events as evidence that the questionable status of 
ethnic minorities is becoming ever more political, regardless of whether the state chooses 
to acknowledge data of their presence in the country or not. 
                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
CHAPTER 3 
Breaking the Silence: Legitimizing Ethnicity in the Political 
Sphere 
 
On January 7, 2015, two armed men entered the Parisian headquarters of France’s 
most renowned satirical publication, Charlie Hebdo, and killed eleven employees in cold 
blood and later executed a police officer as they fled from the scene. The assailants, who 
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cried “Allahu Akbar” and identified themselves as members of Al-Qaeda, massacred 
cartoonists of the controversial magazine. Charlie Hebdo fully exhibits its freedom of 
speech and has no boundaries in its willingness to brutally mock cultures and religions. 
The barbaric effort of the assassins to silence the freedom of speech by silencing the 
bodies that depicted satirical illustrations was made in vain; neither Charlie Hebdo, the 
French media, nor France cowered. The nation united in combative response to the 
attack, galvanizing a fearless front of rallies across France in support of free speech. The 
attack—religiously motivated and carried out by two jihadists who acted independently—
was a singular event and does not play a role in the discussion of officially recognizing 
ethnic and racial groups. However in the aftermath of a shocking tragedy that temporarily 
unified a nation, it became clear to public consciousness that preexisting social 
fragmentation needed to be addressed and remedied.  
The attempt to silence one tenet of democracy ultimately began a dialogue about 
ensuring the fortification of all democratic elements in the French Republic as 
exemplified by Manuel Vall’s voeux à la presse50 speech less than two weeks after the 
shootings. Valls commenced such a discussion by bluntly stating, “Citizenship needs to 
be restructured, reinforced, relegitimized. We must combat this terrible sentiment 
according to which there are second class citizens, or voices that count more than 
others.”51 Even without official record of ethnic minorities, it is understood by the 
government that marginalized groups exist in France as second-class citizens with a 
lesser voice. Valls curtly acknowledges this division, which could have referred to a 	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  Meaning “wish to the press,” speeches are given by the Prime Minister and President at the beginning of 
each year and are somewhat comparable to American State of the Union speeches. 51	  “La citoyenneté a besoin d’être refondée, renforcée, relégitimée. Nous devons combattre ce sentiment 
terrible selon lequel il y aurait des citoyens de seconde zone, ou des voix qui compteraient plus que 
d’autres” translation mine. 
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series of social groups struggling in France, but he then followed this statement by 
denouncing the French Republic as a territorial, social, and ethnic apartheid. In a country 
that does not publicly recognize hyphenated identities (Franco-Algerian, French African, 
etc.) that include a “non-French” cultural component, it is significant for the Prime 
Minister to address ethnicity as a factor in social fragmentation. A century of French 
policy and discourse has been purposeful in perpetuating a singular French civic identity, 
but Vall’s intentionally crafted speech is a prime example of treating the disadvantage of 
an unrepresented group by recognizing its presence. Should the French talk about 
ethnicity and race? A historically contentious topic deemed irrelevant within the political 
arena and justified by democratic principles, the current state of a failed immigration 
model that has left the Français de papier, unable to thrive as either fully French or as 
culturally distinguished, thrusts the subject into the public spotlight and desperately begs 
to be discussed. Policies meant to address immigrant integration have carefully 
approached the problem through the lens of social divides associated with culture, class, 
geography, and citizenship status rather than with ethnicity or race.52 It is through these 
alternative means that the discussion has been skewed in order to retain a politically 
correct observance of French colorblind society.  
Christophe Guilluy, French geographer and author, writes in his 2014 book Fractures 
Françaises of how the ethnicity discussion has been inadvertently addressed through 
territorialization. He claims, “With the crisis of the banlieues, the ‘ethnic question’ was 
associated with a ‘territorial question,’ that of the sensitive zones,”53 That is to say that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Bleich, “Antiracism Without Races,” 52.	  53	  “Avec la crise des banlieues, la «question ethnique» a été associée à une «question territorial», celle des 
quartiers sensibles” translation mine. Christophe Guilluy. Fractures Françaises, (Paris: François Burin, 
2010), 65.	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rather than describe a metropolitan quarter by its demographic composition (Arabs for 
example) the territory will be described as economically sensitive because that is the 
politically correct and socially acceptable discourse. To speak of the banlieues is to imply 
an understood profile of low-income immigrants and their descendants. In an April, 2015 
interview about his books, Guilluy was asked to comment on Valls’ apartheid 
condemnation. He responded that his works and the Prime Minister’s speech were 
essentially speaking of the same issues in pointing out the territorial divides that 
physically embody ethnic divides along with the political fractures that represent social 
fractures.54 
In Fractures Françaises, Guilluy tells a short anecdote of Manuel Valls in 2009 when 
he (député-maire of Évry at the time) visited a second-hand store with a film crew for a 
publicity stunt. The store was most frequented by Arab and African customers, and Valls 
was heard whispering sarcastically “Beautiful image of the town Évry,” knowing that 
viewers would understand that too many Arabs or Africans give a bad image to the town. 
This was supplemented by the comment “Give me some Blancs, some Whites, some 
Blancos.”55 Guilluy describes that:  
“At no moment is the mayor talking about social diversity or citizenship, 
but rather of the ethnic origin of the population. In doing so, he confirms 
what all elected officials know: that the question of the banlieues is not 
limited to a social and urban dimension but it also has an ethnocultural 
extension.”56 
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  Le guichet de l’information. (April 16, 2015). L’APARTHEID FRANCAIS? Banlieues, 
campagnes…Complément d’enquête avril 2015 [Video file]. Retrieved from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=1384&v=ZRgG45bFDWQ 
55 Guilluy, Fractures Francaises, 66. 
56 À aucun moment, le maire ne parle de mixité sociale ou de nationalité, mais bien de l’origine ethnique de 
la population. Ce faisant, il confirme ce que tous les élus savent: que la question des banlieues ne se résume 
pas à une dimension sociale et urbaine mais qu’elle a aussi un prolongement «ethnoculturel»” translation 
mine. Ibid. 
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Differences in ethnic and racial identities cannot be concealed and, though they have 
remained officially unseen by the state, they are very much recognized and stigmatized 
within the French population and even by elected officials. However, the six-year 
transition from Valls’ underhanded, racially loaded comments to his call-to-arms in 
restructuring citizenship and combating apartheid suggest a constructive movement of the 
topic from taboo to legally legitimate.  
3.1 CODIFICATION OF ETHNIC DISCOURSE 
 Geographer Guilluy is not the only scholar to indicate that territory has been used 
as code for the state to form policies implicitly addressing ethnicity and race. Related 
scholarship has seen repeated use of territories as a means of referencing specific social 
groups. Discussion of space and race has been an effective method for the French to 
manage ethnic conflict within the immigration debate by correlating people with places. 
Cédric Audebert’s article “The social geography of ethnic minorities in metropolitan 
Paris: a challenge to the French model of social cohesion?” asserts that recent social 
cohesion policies have focused on territory and place of residents rather than on ethnic 
classification or national origin.57 As a result of the state’s color-blind agenda, the 
dialogue meant to address integration issues has shifted towards much more cautious and 
socially acceptable discourse of socio-economic status within specific geographic 
territories in order to avoid ethnically and racially charged elements of the problem.  
The French state will not supply statistical information on its population’s ethnic 
demographics, yet it publicly recognizes stigmatized regions associated with high 
concentrations of immigrant residents known as zones urbaines sensibles (ZUS), zones de 
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redynamisation urbaine (ZRU), zones franches urbaines (ZFU). The introduction of 
territorialized social cohesion policies have been used to target their disadvantaged 
populations, typically not of native French descent, without acknowledging the relevant 
factor of ethnic and racial identities. Easy internet access to maps of each of the 751 ZUS 
inform French citizens of socio-geographic sensitive zones where the formation of 
foreign communities contained in impoverished banlieues as consequence of social 
immobility are instead seen by the French as separate societies threatening the status quo 
and operating without regard for the laws or the Republic. These cryptic zone 
euphemisms and programs of territorialized social cohesion have been introduced “as a 
way to address the ethnic question without directly institutionalizing it.”58  
In the midst of the controversy over collecting ethnic statistics, policy has targeted 
the ZUS to aid minority groups suffering from high levels of unemployment. Audebert 
explains: 
“Following a highly polarized debate on the relevance of institutionalizing 
ethnic and racial issues (through ethnic statistics and affirmative action), 
the French state has been confronted with an unprecedented challenge: to 
acknowledge and deal with the specific problems of ethnic minorities 
without calling into question the postulate of republican universalism.”59 
 
The author refers to social inequality in France as a territorial issue due to factors such as 
limited socio-economic mobility, but similar dialogue in the United States discusses 
inequality as having a racial or ethnic component. The following chapter will examine 
how the United States uses complete transparency in discussing race and ethnicity to 
combat discrimination in comparison to France’s opposite strategy.  
3.2 AMPLIFYING THE NOISE OF ETHNIC DISCOURSE 	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 The New York Times article “Quantifying Social Division in France,” written in 
response to Valls’ apartheid speech, describes his words “as a shock for a country that, a 
little more than a week earlier, had rallied by the millions in a show of solidarity after a 
rampage by Islamic extremists.”60 The author Bohlen draws attention to Valls’ admission 
that sparking a poisonous debate had been his intention all along. The Prime Minister’s 
condemnation of France as a divided nation can be interpreted as a shock to its people, 
but Valls’ speech is only controversial because of the brutal truth it dares to acknowledge 
under the spotlight. According to Bohlen, “nobody denies that discrimination in France 
exists anyway: Racial or religious profiling as practiced by the police, housing agents and 
employers has been well documented. Now even Mr. Valls is talking about ‘two 
Frances.’”61 It seems that rather than breaking the silence about France’s issue handling 
ethnic diversity, Valls instead amplified the political noise already surrounding the 
controversial debate.  
 Regardless of where one stands on the debate’s spectrum of whether ethnic 
statistics could provide useful information, the presence of ethnic discrimination in 
France is pronounced past the point of deserving legislative attention. A 2012 Report by 
the European Union measured discrimination within its member nations and found that 
“of the eight grounds of discrimination examined in the survey, discrimination on the 
grounds of ethnic origin is seen as the most widespread” by 56% of Europeans.62 The 
seven other grounds of discrimination include gender, sexual orientation, discrimination 
against older people, age discrimination against younger people, religion/beliefs, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Celestine Bohlen, “Quantifying Social Division in France,” New York Times (2015).  
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62 “Special Eurobarometer 393: Discrimination in the EU in 2012” European Commission Report (2012), 
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  34 
disability, and gender identity. Seventy-six percent of French respondents classified 
ethnic discrimination as widespread, the highest proportion of any EU country and 20% 
higher than the average. By contrast, only 17% of EU citizens living in Lithuania and 
26% in Poland and Latvia saw ethnic discrimination as a widespread problem.63 Even 
though France’s demographics are far less homogenous than those of other EU nations 
who claim ethnic discrimination is less widespread, the deviation in public opinions 
clearly highlights the need to effectively address ethnic, among all, discrimination in 
France.  
 On April 17, 2015, Valls announced a €100 million mobilization plan to combat 
“unbearable racism,” just three months after he dared to declare France an apartheid. The 
Prime Minister confronted the public with more words of brutal honesty stating, “Racism, 
anti-Semitism, hatred of Muslims, of foreigners, and homophobia are increasing in an 
unbearable manner.”64 A drastic spike has been seen in discrimination against both 
Muslims and Jews in the past year. Le Monde, one of France’s most widely read news 
sources, published that acts of anti-Semitic discrimination have double in the past year 
and acts of anti-Muslim discrimination have increased by six times in the same period.65 
It is important to remember that ethnic minorities can be the perpetrators in addition to 
the victims; discrimination endured by Muslims and Jews is often carried out by each 
other. President François Hollande described the struggle against racism as a national 
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priority66, and the State’s €100 million allotment of funds promises to deliver actions 
along with the President and his government’s words. Hollande’s government has 
publicly committed to a war to end discrimination and establish social stability amongst 
society’s demographics of ethnic diversity. These actions come at a time of widespread 
national disapproval of Hollande’s leftist government and coincide with the rise of 
support for Marine Le Pen’s right-wing National Front party. The political dimension of 
the State’s response to diversity and the ethnicity debate is unique to France. A range of 
party leaders and their policy proposals reflect a balancing act within the French political 
climate. In the following chapter I will discuss France’s uniqueness in fighting antiracism 
without races.  
  
 
CHAPTER 4 
The Choice of Ignorance?: The Role of Ethnicity in France and 
the United States 
 
In addition to criticism on the home front, the efficacy of France’s colorblind 
approach is questioned abroad, particularly by American skeptics. Criticism from the 
United States stems from the stark difference in its hyper-racialized method of addressing 
the disadvantages of ethnic minorities. Both France and the United States are ethnically 
diverse countries that aim to mitigate discrimination and achieve social cohesion through 
very different policies. Patrick Simon, the policy critic who coined the term “choice of 
ignorance,” asserts that the colorblind paradigm once meant to defend ethnic minorities 
“no longer protects the populations exposed to discrimination; on the contrary, it 	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reinforces the system that puts them at an unfair disadvantage.”67 Whether the avoidance 
of ethnic data collection is a choice of ignorance or an assurance of equality is a matter of 
opinion derived from a nation’s concept of citizenship. Criticisms towards each other’s 
management of ethnic issues cannot be qualified by merit, but they can be analyzed for a 
great understanding of why France and the United States have chosen their respective 
policies.  
In describing France’s model of colorblind integration Erik Bleich explains “the 
French approach is rooted in an understanding of identity differences that diverges 
substantially from that which prevails in the United States.”68 The American mentality of 
integration strives to achieve equality through social inclusiveness of ethnic diversity. 
When I consider France’s current method to ensure equality through invisibility, I recall 
the controversial slogan “Separate but Equal” that provoked the American Civil Rights 
Movement of the 1960s. The French equivalent “Invisible but Equal” seems to resonate 
all too well with the American legacy of discrimination. Though it is not always an 
exemplary model of antiracism, the United States openly collects ethnic data in order to 
quantify its social tensions. Like the French, Americans are committed to their republican 
principles of personal liberties and are often unable to see the French approach as equally 
democratic. The fracture in democratic ideals rests in the way the two countries recognize 
social tensions. According the Bleich, “Social tensions or problems that are associated 
with [ethnic] populations are typically interpreted as problems of immigrant integration 
rather than as ethnic or ‘race’ relations problems, the lens through which much American 
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social policy is viewed.”69 The two countries’ histories also contribute to their different 
understandings of ethnic issues. The United States is rooted in a terrible legacy of slavery 
and segregation, while France has suffered from heinous crimes and genocide under the 
Vichy regime during World War II. French collective memory has not been quick to 
forget the evils that can come of ethnic labeling. 
The role of ethnicity can be construed in many ways, and in France it exists as 
political cleavage for opposing parties just as it does in the United States. As an issue of 
immigrant acculturation, managing ethnic tensions is a crucial political objective across 
party lines. It is essential to understand the political maneuvering that lies behind French 
colorblind policy, a context often overlooked by critics who are eager to force policies 
that have succeeded in their countries upon France. For example, the United States has 
had “long-term confrontation with issues of ethnic/immigrant group identification in 
official statistics”, an “extensive history of immigration from diverse countries of origin”, 
and “the political salience of ‘origins’ in multiple dimensions of social life.”70 Diversity 
in America never had to be introduced by comprehensive policy to an existing notion of 
citizenship because it was upon a “melting pot” attitude of ethnic inclusiveness (in 
theory) that the country was built. On the contrary, “the nature of states in Europe, with 
its longer tradition of nationalism and nation-building, makes it difficult in the political 
sense to refer to recent [immigrants]”71 with a hyphenated dual identity that encompasses 
ethnicity within a civic identity framework, as demonstrated in France. Historian Calvin 
Goldscheider comes to the conclusion that American acknowledgement of multiple 	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ethnic identities is peculiar when perceived from a European context. It is important to 
understand the differences in national mindsets in order to recognize that there is not a 
blanket policy prescription that addresses the unique needs of individual countries’ ethnic 
compositions. If the American ideal of ethnic statistics proves beneficial in the future in 
alleviating tensions and hindering discrimination based on ethnic identity, then France 
must tailor its colorblind policy in a French way that continues to uphold its values.   
It is no surprise that American ideology counters that of the French Republic in 
regards to collecting ethnic data. Both nations aim to achieve an egalitarian, equal 
opportunity state but through opposite means of addressing diverse demographics. 
American acknowledgment of its ethnic makeup and the use of data to protect minority 
groups are thus employed as positive examples by French advocates who wish for 
American policy to translate into a familiar French version. Race relations in the United 
States are far from an exceptional example to be followed by France, but our nation’s 
ability to measure issues of discrimination and openly discuss it is worthy of examination 
by French policymakers. While an American approach accepts multiple ethnic identities 
and thus protects ethnic groups through recognition of their cultural differences, the 
French State carries out policies that aim to protect liberties endowed to citizens by civic 
identity because it is regarded above ethnic identity within the Republic. Both countries 
deliver in protecting their citizens in the eyes of the State: the United States by assuring 
the freedom to difference and France by assuring the freedom from difference. Rather 
than choices of ignorance, both countries seem to altruistically pursue endeavors of 
equality. 
 
CHAPTER 5 
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Conclusion: The French Puzzle 
 
“Census constructions of ethnic groups may best be considered evidence of the 
discourse about ethnicity rather than ethnicity per se. Perhaps the construction of these 
categories are valuable not only as pieces of the ethnic puzzle but also as reflections of 
the puzzle itself.”72 
 
 The puzzling French “ethnic dilemma” has captured the media’s attention and 
caused the nation to reconsider the lifespan of its colorblind policy prescription. The issue 
of ethnicity has been emboldened by current political discourse under President 
Hollande’s government, galvanizing an urgent call-to-arms to combat discrimination and 
social fragmentation. The recent heavy-handed words of the President and Prime Minister 
reflect a need for policy reform to combat discrimination in a more direct manner. This 
thesis analyzed the statistics debate to evaluate whether the implementation of ethnic 
recognition through a reformed model could generate social cohesion for France in the 
future. While there is clearly a political demand for an understanding of ethnicity as a 
component of identity, it is not clear that the formulation of ethnic categories in the 
census would be necessary or beneficial in resolving solving tensions. My findings in 
reviewing recent political discourse suggest that there is a practical need for ethnic data 
that is opposed by a theoretical framework of French citizenship and republicanism. If the 
official collection of ethnic data is of interest to the State in the future, France can pursue 
an individualized method in order to continue to uphold its republican values. It may be 
possible for France to combat racism without recognizing ethnicity or race, but the cost 
of national commitment to equality through colorblindness may soon be higher than the 
price of social stability.   
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In evaluating the ideological, political, and social reasoning behind the debate over 
ethnic data collection, I found a history of French commitment to liberté, égalité, 
fraternité that justifies opposition as well as supporting evidence that suggests France’s 
colorblind approach in the face of ethnic diversity is not conducive to social cohesion. 
Since the turn of the 21st century, the durability of the colorblind model has been 
questioned in the face of heightened social fragmentation that has divided France into 
what some may call an “apartheid,” indicating that the time has come for the French 
approach to be restrategized. Regardless of French public opinion over the debate, the 
Hollande administration’s recent allocation of €100 million to address intolerable racial 
and ethnic discrimination gives legitimacy to the political concern of ethnic identity. 
“Hidden” ethnic data—gathered in various roundabout forms such as urban geographic 
territorialization or counting incarcerated Muslims by the number of inmates who request 
Ramadan meals73—previously existed as a mechanism for quantifying ethnic groups in 
France, but the Constitutional taboo that has surrounded ethnic identities is being 
shadowed by a political agenda that acknowledges the role of ethnicity in society. Recent 
movements toward the French State’s recognition of the political role of ethnicity have 
the potential to reconstruct France’s colorblind policies so that they cultivate social 
stability for the future. 
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